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I. The Cocoa Industry Protocol:  A Brief History 
 
 Over 40% of the world’s cocoa, the primary ingredient in chocolate, comes from 
the West African nation of Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) i.  Beginning in the late 1990s, 
reports began to surface that detailed the pervasive use of abusive child labor in the West 
African cocoa sector.  In 2000 and 2001, media reports in the UK and US describing 
child trafficking and enslavement on Ivorian cocoa farms led to a public outcry and call 
for change.  Chocolate industry companies, faced with a credible threat of legislative 
action, sought to minimize the damage and assure chocolate consumers and lawmakers 
that the industry could tackle this problem without government regulation.   
 Industry representatives met with concerned NGOs, labor unions, government 
officials, and politicians, notably US Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) and Representative 
Eliot Engel (D-NY).  These consultations ultimately led to a voluntary, industry-wide 
Cocoa Protocol in September 2001 that set out time-bound steps to eliminate the worst 
forms of child labor and forced labor from West African cocoa farms by July 2005, and 
freed cocoa companies from the threat of legislation.  Despite cocoa companies’ repeated 
assurance that they would meet the target date, industry largely failed to meet its 
commitments and the deadline passed with the child labor situation virtually unchanged.  
Although lawmakers voiced their displeasureii, cocoa companies faced no sanctions; 
instead, the industry negotiated an extended deadline giving it until July 2008 to 
implement a solution covering half of the cocoa-producing areas of Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana. 
 From the outset, the Protocol has suffered from some serious design flaws.  While 
industry has specifically addressed the worst forms of child labor under ILO Convention 
No. 182 and forced labor under ILO Convention 29, it has not addressed other core labor 
rights in the agreement or in its activities, such as minimum age of employment under 
ILO Convention No. 138.  Further, the industry-led initiative fails to call for concrete 
steps to ensure that farmers are getting a fair price for their product, which significantly 
impacts the use of child labor, as farmers are forced to reduce production costs and rely 
on the cheap labor of children.iii
 
II. Industry’s Primary Obligations under the Protocol
 
The Protocol sets forth an action plan with specific commitments for stakeholders. In 
particular, the cocoa industry agreed to undertake several steps aimed at eliminating child 
labor from its supply chain. 
 
 A.   Establishment of a Joint International Foundation 
 
 The cocoa industry agreed to establish and fund a foundation “to oversee and 
sustain efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor in the growing and processing 
of cocoa beans…The foundation’s purposes will include field projects and a 
clearinghouse on best practices to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.”iv
 In 2002, the International Cocoa Initiative (ICI) was established to fulfill this duty 
under the Protocol.  The foundation began its work on the ground in 2003 and has 
achieved some success.  In an October 2006 address to the Child Labor Coalition in 
Washington DC, ICI Executive Director Peter McAllister described the progress made 
since the foundation’s inception.  ICI currently runs a pilot program in 24 communities in 
Ghana, as well as in six communities in Côte d’Ivoire.  In all cases, these pilot programs 
have enjoyed far more success in Ghana than in Côte d’Ivoire. ICI cites the Ivorian civil 
war (2002-2004) as a major hindrance to program development in that country.v
 ICI’s program work has chiefly consisted of building trust between foundation 
field staff and the pilot communities, and sensitizing the communities to the concept of 
exploitative child labor through training programs.  Communities then voluntarily 
identify child labor as an undesirable practice, and take the lead in identifying incidents 
of child labor abuses.  ICI subsequently supports community members’ initial steps 
against exploitative child labor through facilitating dialogue with local and regional 
leaders, sensitizing local media outlets to child labor issues, and motivating community 
members to organize and advocate for constructive solutions.  In this way, ICI attempts to 
take a “bottom-up” approach to tackling child labor by educating, motivating and 
supporting communities that take the lead in solving a problem they see as their own. 
 The foundation’s efforts have resulted in some success achieved within its 
mandate. Motivated pilot communities in Ghana have been advocating for educational 
improvements and have secured the services of 51 new teachers, classroom construction 
and expansion projects, and significant increases in student enrollment.  All 24 pilot 
communities in Ghana are implementing action plans that include banning children from 
areas where pesticides are being applied, improving and refurbishing classrooms and 
school facilities, and returning children to schools during the week.  On a national level, 
ICI consulted on Ghana’s National Cocoa Child Labor Elimination Plan.vi
 ICI likewise sees local communities as the best monitors and reporters of child 
trafficking in the cocoa sector.  Although rescue and repatriation of trafficked children 
falls outside the scope of the foundation’s mandate, ICI advises its local partner 
organizations upon receiving a report of child trafficking in cocoa or any other sector.  
The foundation has also finished the first of three educational brochures on the topic.  
These materials will target villagers, law enforcement and judiciary officials, and other 
important constituencies.   
 In Côte d’Ivoire, ICI has partnered with MESAD (Movement for Education, 
Health and Development), a local NGO that provides accommodation and needed 
services to victims of the worst forms of child labor and forced labor.  The foundation is 
also expanding its relationship with CFRAR (Centre for Training and Research in Rural 
Development), an organization that educates local communities about exploitative child 
labor and works to expand access to education.  ICI is helping to provide one new 
CFRAR-organized school with school materials, and is helping fund the construction of 
accommodations for the teaching staff.  In an effort to build capacity for detecting child 
labor and trafficking abuses, ICI trained 35 Ivorian Ministry of Labour inspectors.vii
 ICI has had to make the most of limited resources in pursuing its mission.  As 
stipulated in the Protocol, Industry donors must “provide initial and on-going, primary 
financial support for the foundation.”viii  The organization’s total budget for 2004, its first 
full operating year, amounted to 1,523,055 Swiss francs (about 1,228,350 US dollars).ix 
The ICI is currently submitted a new three year funding proposal.  No funding decisions 
have been made yet. 
 
 B.   Development and Implementation of Standards of Public   
  Certification 
 
  1. Background
 The cocoa industry agreed that “in partnership with other major stakeholders [it] 
will develop and implement credible, mutually-acceptable, voluntary, industry-wide 
standards of public certification . . . that cocoa beans and their derivative products have 
been grown and/or processed without any of the worst forms of child labor.”x  The 
chocolate industry agreed to present lawmakers with a plan to implement a monitoring 
and certification system by July 1, 2005. Unfortunately, by July 2005, the Chocolate 
Manufacturers Association revised its position and stated that it couldn’t fulfill the 
promises it made in 2001, blaming political instability in West Africa for the failure to 
implement a credible monitoring program.xi  Failing to meet its promised deadline, 
industry has delayed the implementation of its monitoring and certification system and a 
target date for full implementation has not been set. Currently, the industry has promised 
that it will monitor and certify only fifty percent of Ghana’s and Cote d’Ivoire’s cocoa-
producing areas by July 2008.xii  
   
2. Industry Proposed Monitoring and Certification Plan 
 
According to the industry, the child labor monitoring plan will be carried out 
using methodology similar to that of a census.  Local NGOs and community groups will 
collect data from a statistically significant sample of West African cocoa farms, 
collecting data related to labor practices and related factors that bear on the lives of cocoa 
farmers and their communities, as well as noting any progress made in these areas.  The 
resulting information will be compiled and presented in the form of a certification report. 
 The Verification Working Group (VWG), an independent oversight group set up 
to examine the monitoring and certification process, issued this overview of the proposed 
certification system: 
 
“According to the cocoa/chocolate industry, individual producer country governments 
will issue a “certificate”. The certificate will be a statement of fact regarding West 
African cocoa farming practices; providing a view of labor conditions on the ground, 
progress towards improvement and an explanation of required remedial actions. The 
cocoa certification system will not result in a product label. It will not guarantee that any 
particular cocoa bean or bar of chocolate has been produced in a certain way. As such, 
the “certificate” will reflect the certification of practices and processes at the farm and 
community level with a view towards defining clearly where improvements need to occur 
and progress towards those improvements.  Information is not yet available about the 
specific contents of the certificate, how often it will be issued, to whom it will be issued, 
and what form it will take.”xiii
 
Industry says it is dedicating more than $5 million annually to support the full 
implementation of the certification system for cocoa farming labor practices and for 
programs to improve the well-being of the more than 1.5 million farm families growing 
cocoa in West Africa.xiv  However, it states that governments must also play a primary 
role in funding.  As VWG states, “Cote D’Ivoire has indicated that they plan to fund 
monitoring and certification work by allocating around US $4 million from the existing 
[cocoa] levy structure to these activities, which will be managed by one of the state 
organisations already operating.”xv  In June 2006, Industry and the Cote d’Ivoire 
government announced the launching of a pilot monitoring program in Oumé province, 
which is not known to have a significant problem with child trafficking.  The cost of the 
program is roughly $17million and would last for 15 months.  There has been no 
commitment by industry to fund the pilot program or any other future monitoring 
program.xvi
 As described more fully below, the International Labour Organization (ILO) has 
begun working with the government of Ghana to establish a design for a national 
monitoring system under the ILO’s West Africa Commercial Agriculture Program to 
Combat Hazardous and Exploitive Child Labour program (WACAP). Though under the 
Protocol the ILO is not responsible for the development and implementation of a 
monitoring system, Industry has indicated that “[t]he system established in Cote d’Ivoire 
will be based upon the ILO IPEC monitoring program developed in Ghana.”xvii  To this 
end, Industry has contributed some small amounts of funding for the WACAP program.  
This funding, though, expired in early 2006.xviii
  
 
3. Verification Plan 
 
The Verification Working Group (VWG) was established by industry to set up an 
oversight mechanism to ensure that the goals of the Protocol are being carried out.  
According to VWG, “[t]he verification system is an independent, third party effort to 
check the integrity of the certification and monitoring system. This will include a review 
of the scope of the certification and monitoring, and will include both quantitative and 
qualitative assessments. The verification system will observe the certification system on 
an on-going basis and monitor compliance with national law, international law, and the 
Protocol/Joint Statement.”xix  
 VWG’s Verification System Overview Paper, published in February/March 2005, 
outlines the three major objectives of the program: 
 
1.   To determine whether information presented in the certification report is 
based on sound and appropriately collected data, consistent with the reality of 
the child labor and forced labor situation; 
 
2.   To determine whether any conclusions drawn and any remedial action 
committed to in the certification reports constitute a reasonable response to 
the issues raised by the monitoring; 
 
3.   To check the degree to which any conclusions and systems of remediation 
committed to in the certification reports are being effectively implemented. 
 
VWG does not anticipate its own staff members performing verification directly; 
rather, it anticipates the formation of a small nonprofit organization that will contract 
with local partners on the ground.  VWG will identify and train the verifiers in their tasks, 
evaluate the quality of their work, and issue final verification reportxx  Verifiers will use 
“documented and well-defined methodologies and systematic procedures” in the course 
of their work, and must have “free and continued access to all sources and places” 
covered by the monitoring and certification system.xxi  Other requirements include 
transparent reporting of verifiers’ findings and a clear statement of the level of assurance 
that verification will provide.xxii
 Although the verification system will not be implemented until the monitoring 
and certification system is in place,xxiii VWG has recommended for further study three 
options that could be used to fund the organization’s work in a sustainable manner.  The 
first option would require “key companies in the cocoa supply chain” to pay a levy based 
on the volume of beans purchased; the second would impose a levy on cocoa being stored 
for the futures market in consuming country warehouses; and the third would add a flat 
fee to trades in cocoa lots on the futures market.xxiv  VWG notes that the costs of 
verification should be “passed up the supply chain rather than down to farmers 
themselves.”xxv
 
4. Independent Monitoring and Implementation Oversight 
 
 In July 2005, when the initial deadline for the implementation of industry’s 
monitoring and certification plan expired unfulfilled, Sen. Harkin and Rep. Engel 
announced plans to establish an independent oversight entity with the mission to monitor 
the implementation of the Harkin-Engel Protocol in order to ensure accountability, 
momentum and transparency on the part of industry.  A university with “expertise in 
African studies, child labor and business ethics” would be hired “to provide oversight of 
government and private industry efforts to develop and implement mechanisms to 
eliminate the worst forms of child labor (WFCL) in the cocoa sector in Côte d’Ivoire and 
Ghana.”xxvi  
In October 2006, USDOL/ILAB announced that the Payson Center for 
International Development and Technology at Tulane University in New Orleans would 
receive a $4.3 million, three-year contract.xxvii  The initiative will study the health of 
exploited children, train public officials in Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana to monitor the 
incidence of child labor in the cocoa industry and report to the department and Congress 
on the status of child labor certification, monitoring and verification systems.xxviii  
According to USDOL/ILAB, “the reports will also cover efforts to establish child labor 
monitoring and verification systems to assess progress made toward meeting obligations 
under the Harkin-Engel Protocol.”xxix
 
III. Other Activities Related to Child Labor and Cocoa in West Africa
 
A. West African Cocoa and Commercial Agricultural Project (WACAP) 
 
 Launched in 2003 as a joint program of the United States Department of Labor 
(DOL) and the International Labor Organization (ILO), with industry providing 16% of 
the funding (US $1m), WACAP’s mission is to prevent and eliminate hazardous child 
labor in cocoa and other agricultural industries in West Africa.  WACAP will also work 
in conjunction with the USAID-funded STCP program (see below), which also receives 
an undisclosed amount of support from the World Cocoa Foundation.  
 The WACAP program will implement 30 action programs that will “(i) moblilize 
participation and strengthen capacity of social partners; (ii) carry out extensive awareness 
raising campaigns; (iii) demonstrate a comprehensive package of social protection 
measures including counseling, education, and training; (iv) establish a credible and cost-
effective child labor monitoring system; and (v) enhance the knowledge base and 
disseminate information. 
 WACAP has begun pilot projects aimed at establishing a National Child Labor 
Monitoring System (NCLMS).  This system is comprised of a network of national, 
district and community level Child Labor Monitoring Committees who are charged with 
the design and implementation of a feasible, credible and transparent child labor 
monitoring system that will ensure that workplaces from which children have been 
removed continue to remain free of child labor and that children removed from work are 
participating in social protection services. The program is being pilot tested in 56 
communities in five districts across Ghana and, if successful, will be the model for local 
community monitoring of labor conditions on cocoa farms in West Africa.   
 However, the relationship between WACAP’s monitoring system, which has total 
funding of only US$6m, and the monitoring program that industry has proposed is 
unclear.  Although Industry has stated that it will model its monitoring and certification 
after the WACAP program, WACAP has explained that any credible system of 
certification must include detailed farm-level components such that workplaces can be 
identified clearly as free of child labor; that follow-up visits be conducted to ensure that 
the farms remain child labor free; and that children who are released from labor are 
participating in social protection services.xxx None of these elements appear in Industry’s 
monitoring proposal described above. 
The WACAP program was designed to be a supplement to the Protocol, and not 
to fulfill Industry’s commitments under the Protocol. Sen. Harkin, who was able to obtain 
the funding for the WACAP program through his work with the Labor, Health, and 
Human Services and Education Appropriations Subcommittee, has been clear that 
Industry continues to “bear the social, moral, and financial responsibility for fully 
implementing the Protocol.”xxxi  
Funding for the WACAP program ended in April 2006.  No information is 
publicly available about extension of continued funding for the three year program. 
 
B. Sustainable Tree Crop Program (STCP) Farmer Field Schools 
 
 In 2002, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
broadened the scope of its already existing Sustainable Tree Crop Program (STCP) to 
include a child labor component in its pilot extension program for Farmer Field Schools 
for cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon. The task for 
developing the program was contracted to the International Institute for Tropical 
Agriculture (IITA). This program has been financially supported by the USAID, the UK 
Department for International Development, the Danish International Development 
Agency, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Ivorian Fond de 
Developpment et de Promotion des Activites des Producteurs de Café et de Cocoa, Mars 
Inc., and the World Cocoa Foundation.  The STCP Farmer Field School (FFS) West 
Africa program was initiated in March 2003 with the first training and curriculum 
development workshop, as well as training for master trainers.  At this initial meeting, 
country action plans were developed for the initiation of Farmer Field Schools in these 
select countries. 
 Subsequent to the signing of the Protocol, child labor sensitization training has 
been included in the STCP Farmer Field School curriculum. The content for this 
curriculum was developed in coordination with the ILO’s WACAP program.  The 
training programs focus almost entirely on awareness-raising for three predominant 
occupations that meet the definition of the worst forms of child labor: (1) the carrying of 
heavy loads; (2) the use of machetes to clear fields; and (3) the application of pesticides.  
The child labor sensitization program comprises only a small portion of the FFS 
curriculum, which is primarily focused on agricultural training programs aimed at 
increasing cocoa yields and improving on sustainable agricultural techniques in West 
Africa. In this area, the STCP has claimed some success in raising cocoa yields for 
participating farmers by as much as 40%.  However, this success has come at a cost to the 
farmers, who, in some areas, have had to more than double the amount of labor needed in 
order to get just a 30% increase in yields, thus reducing overall productivity per labor 
input.  Furthermore, due in part to the increase volume of cocoa entering the market, a 
30% increase in yields only nets a 23% increase in revenue, further increasing the overall 
cost to farmers per labor input.xxxii  
With respect to the child labor component of the curriculum, the STCP claims 
some measure of success resulting from their child labor sensitization classes during the 
Farmer Field Schools.  In a survey conducted in 2005 in Ghana, the STCP reported that 
there are 540 fewer children in the Atwima region in Ghana.  Further, the cursory study 
reported that enrollment rates for children in schools exceeded 90 percent.  Of note, 
however, is that education enrollment rates are positively associated with the production 
output on the farms, which indicates that a change in the marketability of cocoa will have 
strong effects on the education levels of the children, and many will be forced back into 
the fields.xxxiii
The FFS limits the number of participants to around 30 and is selective of its 
participants due to a significant lack of resources. One recommendation suggests 
introducing more selection criteria for the participants, including accepting only younger 
and well educated farmers for the program. Additionally, one indicator used to measure 
the success of the program has been the whether the farmers are willing to pay tuition for 
FFS, though it is unclear from the record whether they have had to pay any tuition. This 
raises concerns that the long-term viability of FFS involves shifting the burden to farmers 
to pay for training programs.xxxiv
 The relationship between the STCP and the ICI remains undefined and their 
efforts appear to mirror one another in many ways. 
   
C. WINROCK International’s CLASSE Program 
 
 In 2003, Winrock International was contracted by the USDOL to establish the 
Child Labor Alternatives Through Sustainable Systems in Education (CLASSE) project.  
In 2004 and 2005, the World Cocoa Foundation (US$115,000), Mars Inc. ($260,000), 
and the Norwegian Association of Chocolate Manufacturers ($225,000) signed 
agreements with Winrock to continue support for an extension to the CLASSE program.  
 The goal of the CLASSE program is to strengthen formal and non-formal 
education and to encourage school attendance for working children in and around cocoa 
farms with the goal of reducing the “prolific” use of inefficient agricultural practices in 
Cote d’Ivoire, which, they claim, increases the incidence of child labor on farms.  To do 
this, CLASSE emphasizes adapting vocational education in schools which includes a 
curriculum of farming practices and agro-marketing as well as functional literacy for 
students and community members.  Winrock will be expanding the program beyond just 
Ehoueguie, Cote d’Ivoire to three other schools and will develop a curriculum for grade 7 
to 9.  The curriculum will address agricultural education, child labor, health, and 
HIV/AIDS. In addition, through the CLASSE program, Winrock has been providing 
micro-credit loans as a part of its scholarship program to improve already-existing small 
businesses. 
 The CLASSE program will also be training between 400 and 600 young people in 
agricultural vocational skills while creating and maintaining a nursery used for training 
and research.  In addition, 3000 other young persons will be taught child labor awareness 
and life-skills.  The program is available to children aged 12 – 18 who are not currently in 
school.  Furthermore, Farmers Clubs will be established to train members in leadership 
skills, public speaking and time management as well as a market study of their region for 
different agricultural products. 
 
D. Initiative for African Cocoa Communities 
 
 The IACC was established in May 2005 by Cargill, the Hershey Company, Mars 
Inc., Nestle USA, the Chocolate Manufacturers Association, and the National 
Confectioners Association.  The IACC’s programs address education in Ghana and 
Cote d’Ivoire.  The programs funded through the IACC are the following:xxxv
1. The Winrock education programs funded by Mars Inc. in Cote d’Ivoire. 
(see above).  
2. A program supported by UNICEF and the National Confectioners 
Association, which will provide afternoon schooling for children ages 8 – 
12 in several districts and communities in the cocoa growing areas of 
Ghana.  Children will be able to attend school in the afternoon after 
working in the morning.   
3. Lastly, the Hershey Company is supporting a project by the International 
Foundation for Education and Self-Help to provide teacher training 
programs for primary and secondary teachers in the cocoa growing regions 
of both Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana. 
 
 One of the above mentioned programs has been described as a school with a small 
vegetable garden that “at best, might feed fewer than half the students in the school for a 
few days per week.  Directors of the little enterprise maintain that the tree nursery will 
eventually generate money to pay for food, a necessary development since the chocolate 
companies have made no commitment to long-term funding of either the nursery or 
garden.”xxxvi
 
 
QUESTIONS THE COCOA INDUSTRY HAS FAILED TO ANSWER
 
1) Industry has specifically refused to commit, on several public occasions, to sourcing 
cocoa from the pilot communities in Ghana and Cote D’Ivoire where the WACAP 
and other pilot monitoring/certification programs may take effect.  Moreover, in 
many of these communities the cocoa trees are old, yields are decreasing and without 
sustained investments in cultivating new trees, farms in the pilot regions may cease 
altogether to be profitable for farmers.  What kind of ongoing commitment, if any, 
will industry make to monitored regions if the proposed programs take effect? How 
does the industry intend to create incentives for farmers to eliminate abusive child 
labor from its supply chain? What long-term commitment will the Industry make to 
the farmers who participate in their program? 
 
2) An assessment of this issue from the European Union in 2005 stated that a key 
element to a credible plan is transparency of supply chain.  Transparency in the 
supply chain has been outright rejected as an option by the Ivoirien cocoa boards with 
whom the industry works, as “an idea of the foreigners that simply gives an extra 
advantage to our competitors.” To date, major buyers of West African cocoa have 
refused to make public information related to their ability to trace products to supplier 
farms.  Will industry take the necessary steps to introduce transparency into their 
sourcing operations? 
 
3) Cote d’Ivoire’s trade privileges with the United States, under the Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) were revoked in late 2004.  Although the exact reasons for 
the suspension of privileges are not publicly known, the US government did review 
information related to the problems of corruption, lack of transparency, and 
expropriation of foreign property in Cote d’Ivoire.  Given these extremely serious 
systemic issues, what are we to make of the industry’s reliance on government-
supported efforts to work with farmers and villagers toward certification of the cocoa 
industry?  How credible can government-directed certification be, and how can the 
government be expected to provide the necessary personnel and funding to support 
such an initiative? 
 
4) Does the industry have an alternative plan on monitoring and certification in a 
situation where the government would be unable to provide such services due to lack 
of finance or a strong central functioning government? 
 
 
5) Other industries have been able to institute monitoring programs that utilize internal 
monitors as the first line of investigation and troubleshooting on labor problems.  Use 
of internal, company monitors is common in the apparel and footwear industries, the 
sporting goods industry, and this model has been applied to some agricultural 
industries, i.e. bananas, timber and cut flowers.  These industries also support a 
plethora of multi-stakeholder and third-party certification initiatives, but the first test 
of a company’s commitment to work in good faith with third party monitoring or 
certification is in all these cases that company’s investment in hiring and training its 
own staff to investigate problems in its supplier facilities.  To date no company in the 
cocoa industry has invested time or resources into developing internal compliance 
programs.  Why has internal compliance not been on the table? 
 
6) Given that there are 10 major cocoa exporters operating in Cote d’Ivoire, amongst 
which the largest ones are Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, and Nestle, who have a 
consistent network of suppliers and middlemen on the ground, what are these 
companies doing, independently of the industry’s joint projects, to train and monitor 
their suppliers? 
• How will these individual efforts be coordinated with any other monitoring or 
certification programs? 
• Will industry prioritize efforts to organize farms into more easily monitored 
cooperatives? 
 
7) How does Industry define “certification”?  Given the historical moment in which the 
Protocol was developed (mid-2001), we assume that its reference to public 
certification, as opposed to the independent third-party monitoring pioneered by other 
industries, is a direct reference to the Kimberley Process for certification of diamonds.  
The Kimberley process provides an independent, third-party audit process for 
voluntary company certification that diamonds are not sourced from conflict zones.  It 
also provides for penalties for companies found in violation of the standard.  In the 
US, the Kimberley certification process is supported by legislation, the Clean 
Diamond Trade Act. 
 
Unlike the Kimberley process (or most other third-party certification programs), the 
cocoa industry is reluctant to identify the actual product being certified.  That being 
the case, it remains for industry to clarify the following, as well as to define what 
exactly is meant in the protocol by “certification” since the term is apparently being 
used in a manner not consistent with its standard English definition: 
• What is the Industry certifying exactly? 
• Has Industry reached any agreements with organizations that will do the 
monitoring and certification? 
• At what point can the cocoa be certified free of child labor? 
 
8) With regard to the need to assure the environmental sustainability and the social 
responsibility of the cocoa sourced from Cote d’Ivoire what benchmarks must cocoa 
suppliers to chocolate manufacturers and retailers meet? Who certifies compliance 
with these standards? 
 
9) It has been very difficult to trace the money involved with the various programs and 
initiatives described in this memo.  Our back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests 
that to date, US taxpayers have spent approximately $10 million dollars toward 
initiatives to deal with this problem entirely apart from the industry protocol (i.e. $5 
million in US government funding for the WACAP program and an additional $4.5 
million in funding for the Tulane University oversight project).  To date, over a five 
year period the entire chocolate industry has spent approximately $3 million toward 
this subject from what can publicly be documented ($1 million for the WACAP 
program, slightly over $1 million for the ICI, and an additional $1 million for various 
programs related to cocoa but not necessarily related to child labor, including those 
administered through the World Cocoa Foundation). Currently unaccounted for is the 
$17 million needed to operate the pilot programs, of which Cote D’Ivoire committed 
to paying $4million. What is the cost of establishing a comprehensive monitoring, 
certification, and verification program, and what will industry commit to pay for these 
costs? What “resources” will Industry provide to fund the monitoring, certification 
and verification operations? 
• How much money? Who will receive the money? 
• Will industry provide other types of resources? 
• Who else besides Industry will be providing resources? How much? 
• How will they ensure that funds or other resources are spent properly? 
 
10) Industry has a proven track record of promising to farmers that, if they change their 
practices and invest their own money in making the change, then the farmers will 
profit greatly through sales to the companies.  Sadly, the companies have a history of 
failing to meet their commitment or shifting production to other countries. If farmers 
can show they are complying with good labor practices, will Industry commit to 
buying from them through long-term contractual arrangements? 
• Will Industry provide participating farmers with contracts? 
• Will Industry commit to paying farmers a price commensurate with a higher 
cost of production? OR 
• Will Industry just simply move production to another part of the world and 
begin their practices over again? 
 
11) If child labor violations or other labor abuses are discovered on a given supplier farm 
will Industry commit to following a formal remediation process rather than abandon 
the supplier altogether? 
• How will the remediation/rehabilitation programs operate? 
 
12) The Verification Working Group (VWG), while apparently intended to mirror the 
independent oversight provided in the Kimberley process by the Clean Diamond Act, 
and in other industries by multi-stakeholder bodies or other independent verifiers 
such as the Fair Labor Association, Rainforest Alliance or Transfair USA, neither has 
a formal structure like these organizations, nor does it appear to represent or be 
accountable to a broad range of stakeholders in board, governance or makeup.  Why 
has the industry failed either to create an independent, stand-alone entity with a 
credible and representative Board, or to develop a publicly accountable multi-
stakeholder initiative to oversee the certification process? 
 
13) Given the fact that low world prices of cocoa is a result of overproduction in the 
world market, how will increasing each farmer’s cocoa yield through Farmer Field 
School training programs going to help farmers get a better price for their product to 
improve their lives and that of their children? 
 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
A. Transparency
  
 All cocoa exporting corporations should be able to provide complete 
evidence about their supply chain down to the farm level, throughout the world.  
Cocoa companies must prove that they can chart their own supply chains if their 
public commitment to worldwide monitoring under the Protocol is to have any 
credibility.  Importing corporations should publicly demand supply chain 
transparency from the exporting corporations with which they do business. 
 
B. Direct Supply Chain Management Reforms 
 
Exporting corporations should be able to provide evidence showing that 
they have trained their buyers and quality control specialists, who have direct 
contact with the farmers, on what practices constitute violations of local and 
international standards on the worst forms of child labor and forced labor, and on 
methodologies to independently verify evidence provided by farmers and local 
communities.   
  
 C. Support the Re-establishment of the International Cocoa Agreement 
  
  To ensure fair and stable pricing worldwide, industry should support and 
 encourage participation of key governments (incl. Ivory Coast and US) in the 
 International Cocoa Agreement and in particular support reinstatement of the 
 ICA's original language of achieving market stabilization and fair producer prices.  
  
D. Contractual Commitments to Purchase and Remediation 
 
 Exporting corporations should provide a formal, written guarantee to all 
farmers who have agreed to produce in accordance with core labor standards, 
and/or to participate in the ILO/government programs, that states (a) their 
commitment to purchase from that particular farm during a particular season and 
(b) their commitment not to abandon the supplier if problems are discovered, but 
instead to provide support and resources toward the development of solutions or 
remediation of those problems. 
 
E. Sustained Commitment to Fair Trade Cocoa 
  
 All cocoa industry stakeholders, be they importers, exporters, 
manufacturers, or retailers, should commit to purchasing five percent of their total 
cocoa purchases under Fair Trade Certified conditions, as defined by Fairtrade 
Labelling Organizations International (FLO).  This level of five percent should be 
seen as a starting minimum.  A sustained and growing commitment to Fair Trade 
Certified cocoa will help bring participating cocoa farmers an added degree of 
economic stability and a further incentive to grow and harvest their crops in 
accordance with core labor standards. 
 
F. Investment in Strengthening Farmer Bargaining Power 
 
 Industry companies (including exporters, importers, manufacturers and 
retailers) should assist in bringing small farmers to the market by facilitating the 
development of cooperatives.  Farmers organized into cooperatives, particularly 
Fair Trade cooperatives, can demand a higher price for their product and 
eliminate wasteful payments to middlemen.  Specifically, through the existing ICI, 
Socodevi or other relevant initiatives working on the ground with cocoa producers, 
an agreed-upon entity should assess the level of support necessary for the 
expansion of fair trade cooperatives in this sector and should establish a process 
to allow farmers themselves to determine and communicate their pre-financing 
and capacity building needs. 
 
G. Investment in Trafficked Children’s Communities of Origin 
 
 The problem of trafficked labor cannot be solved simply by policing the 
end users; investments in the poor communities forced to send their youth into 
bonded labor are also needed.  Whether through the ICI or another existing NGO, 
in this industry stakeholders must commit ongoing funding toward a plan that 
assists former victims of trafficking who have been repatriated to their 
communties, and that invests in those communities’ economic development to 
provide local youth with meaningful employment options in future. 
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